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However one assesses the details of the new Labour Relations Act, surely 
South Africa's progress in labor law reform shines by comparison to the 
stalemate and drift on this front in the United States. Our basic law on 
collective bargaining the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 - received 
its most recent substantial revision in 1959. In basic conception and 
structure, the NLRA still reflects the thinking of an earlier, manufactures-
based economy relatively sheltered from global economic forces. A sus-
tained effort to overhaul the NLRA during the Carter Administration in the 
late 1970s died in Congress, and labor law reform was off the political 
agenda during the Reagan-Bush years. Meanwhile, there is rapid change in 
the legal status of individual employees, but this is occurring in an unsys-
tematized and largely ineffective manner. 
President Bill Clinton's election in 1992 raised new hopes for reform. As 
a so-called "new" (ie, neo-liberal) Democrat, Clinton brought no deep 
commitment to collective bargaining or trade unionism to the White 
House, but made several early and promising moves. The Democrats 
promptly pushed through Congress the Family & Medical Leave Act, which 
guarantees employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave-of-absence to fulfill 
parenting and other caretaking responsibilities. For all its weaknesses and 
loopholes. the FMLA was an enormous achievement. Moreover. Clinton 
chose a thoughtful and energetiC Secretary of Labor. Robert B. Reich, and 
made other excellent appointments in the labor field. 
In addition, the Administration, encouraged by organized labor, estab-
lished a high-profile commission to study and propose changes in labor 
and employment legislation. Officially known as the Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations. the body is commonly referred 
to as the "Dunlop Commission" after its chair. Harvard University Profes-
sor John T Dunlop. Dunlop is a world-renowned labor relations scholar 
who was himself once the Secretary of Labor. The panelists included two 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
other former Labor Secretaries, leading business and labor figures, and a 
core of highly respected academics of generally progressive outlook. The 
Dunlop Commission held well-publicized hearings, both in Washington 
and out in the field, and it drew upon the energies and resources of a 
large number of interested labor relations professionals and academics. I 
had the privilege to be called as an academic witness and to participate in 
a law-professors study-group convened by the Commission's counsel, 
Harvard Professor Paul C Weiler. 
The stage seemed set for the Commission to propel labor relations is-
sues back into the forefront of American polities and to produce a major 
proposal for legal reform. As events unfolded, the Commission's achieve-
ments were more modest. The crucial development was the capture by 
conservative Republicans of both legislative Houses in the November 1994 
elections. As everyone knew immediately, this closed the door to even the 
most mild reform legislation for the foreseeable future. Reopening that 
door will require a dramatic transformation of the electorate. 
Many progressives had hoped that organized labor would be able to use 
the Dunlop process as a platform to reach out beyond its traditional 
constituency and to project the issue of labor law reform into popular 
consciousness so that all American working people, including the over-
whelming majority who are not unionized, would understand labor law 
reform as an issue that concerns their most vital interests, needs, and 
aspirations. Perhaps that task was impossible of achievement; but in any 
event, labor law reform did not surface in the mainstream of U.S. political 
debate. In addition to the Republican election victory, labor's own sup-
porters became somewhat bogged down in technical details of the debate. 
Moreover, some currents of opinion at the rank-and-file level were hostile 
to or suspicious of the Commission because it appeared to take seriously 
certain agenda items pushed by management. 
The Commission issued a lengthy fact-finding volume in May 1994. 
While poorly edited, the report is and will remain an important compen-
dium of insight and data regarding employment and labor relations in the 
United States. The fact-finding report reFlects the experience and energy of 
its talented and accomplished academic members and counsel. 
Given the excitement and hopes that accompanied the Commission's 
appointment, its final report and recommendations, issued 9 January 
1995, must be judged disappointing. The report contains many interesting 
observations and proposals, and it should be celebrated for its emphasis 
Gn wage stagnation and increasing income inequality in the United States. 
and on the problems of so-called "contingent" or "atypical" workers. 
However, overall, the final report lacks the ambition and vision one would 
hope for in a program for labor law reform for the 21 st century. No doubt 
the drafters' optimism was punctured by the knowledge, as of the previ-
ous November, that labor law reform would be impossible in the Newt 
Gingrich era. Frustratingly, the final report has generated very little serious 
discussion and debate, and it has had no short-run practical consequence. 
In a word, labor law reform in the United States is stalled. In this, as in 











































LABOR LAW FOR THE 2tST CENTURY: STALLED REFORM IN THE US 
The only major, post-Dunlop legislative development entirely ignored 
the Commission's plea for a comprehensive rethinking. Responding to 
intense pressure from some (but by no means all) sectors of the business 
community, the House of Representatives on 27 September 1995, passed 
a bill (HR 743) known as the "Teamwork for Employees and Managers 
(TEAM) Act." The bill would have amended NLRA section 8(a)(2), the 
"company union" prohibition, which makes it illegal for employers to set 
up, dominate, or interfere with the administration of labor unions. 
The Dunlop final report, over the dissent of commissioner Douglas A. 
Fraser, formerly president of the United Auto Workers, suggested a need 
for clarification or reinterpretation of NLRA section 8(a)(2) to remove a 
legal cloud hovering over bonafide employee participation schemes, such 
as those relating to product quality and employee health and safety, while 
continuing the ban on company unions. However, the TEAM bill would 
have cut a major hole in section 8(a)(2), effectively permitting employers 
to manipulate "participation" schemes so as to undermine collective 
bargaining. Despite some fancy industrial relations rhetoric, the TEAM bill 
was class legislation in its crudest form. The Senate passed a nearly iden-
tical bill (s 295) on 10 July 1996, and a reconciled text was approved and 
sent to the White House on July 18. President Clinton vetoed the bill on 30 
July 1996. Thus ended the Dunlop process, at least for now. 
t was invited to appear before the Commission on 19 January 1994, at a 
time when hope for labor law reform still ran high. The Commission 
particularly solicited my testimony with respect to the section 8(a)(2) 
question on employee participation schemes. With the Commission's 
indulgence. r submitted a prepared statement offering a broader vision of 
labor law reform for the 2 I st century before addressing the technical 
statutory questions. The editors of Law, Democracy & Development gra-
ciously suggested that the general portions of my statement might interest 
their readers. There follows a lightly edited text, from which I have deleted 
much of the concluding, technical discussion. 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KARL E KLARE SUBMITTED TO THE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS 
1 A DEMOCRACY-ENHANCING APPROACH TO LABOR LAW 
REFORM 
In my scholarly activities and writings over fifteen years, I have advocated 
what I call a "democracy-enhancing approach" to labor law reform.' The 
basic premise of my approach is that, as our vision projects into the 2 1st 
century, the gUiding principle and role of labor law should be to expand 
and enhance democracy at every level of the experience and organization 
of work. Public policy and law should be framed and administered so as to 
democratize work organisation, both at the upper tiers of the firm's strategic 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
decision-making processes, and at the mundane level of day-to-day opera-
tions and decisions. Labor law should embrace a commitment to power-
sharing between employers and employees. 
At the same time, the democracy-enhancing approach to labor law re-
form looks beyond the organisation and governance of work itself. In 
service to both democratic values and productive efficiency, policy should 
establish economic. social. and legal conditions that will enable all em-
ployees to experience and enjoy opportunities for learning. self-develop-
ment, and expression through paid employment as well as other pursuits, 
such as caretaking relationships and education. Reform should encourage 
public and enterprise investment in human capital, insure effective and 
egalitarian linkages between paid employment and other spheres of life, 
and seek to break down all forms of occupational segregation and labor 
market segmentation based on gender, race, class. or other invidiously 
discriminatory category. 
The democracy-enhancing approach to labor law reform is grounded in 
an enlarged conception of democracy that would extend democracy 
beyond politics as such and into "private" spheres of social and economic 
life such as paid employment. A democratic culture should aspire to 
awaken and nurture in all people their capacities for self-realization and 
self-governance. At minimum. a democratic society should provide all 
people with meaningful opportunities to participate in making the deci-
sions that affect their lives. Democracy in work is both a normative end in 
itself, because of its contribution to human self-realization, and addition-
ally. it contributes to civic democracy by enhancing peoples' capacities to 
participate in politics and by breaking down rigid divisions of labor that 
inhibit civic participation. 
Achieving these ideals requires not only that people are afforded oppor-
tunities to make choices and to participate in decision-making and dia-
logue. but also that these choices and opportunities are not merely formal 
but genuine. For this. all people must be so situated in terms of the basic 
necessities of life. training, and legal entitlements that they can meaning-
fully avail themselves of opportunities for choice and participation. 
These premises. which are elaborated in greater detail in my scholarly 
writings, lead me to a series of conclusions about the desirable direction of 
labor law and employment reform that J would like to share with the 
Commission. 
From a democracy-enhancing perspective, the system of labor law and 
collective bargaining we inherited from the 1930s and 1940s (referred to 
herein as 'the New Deal system of collective bargaining') was an enor-
mous advance. It has empowered millions of employees. allowed them to 
improve their living circumstances and working conditions, and afforded 
them significant opportunities to participate in and influence the decisions 
affecting their working and economic lives. As I shall argue below, the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and New Deal system embody endur-
ing democratic values that we should respect and preserve. And that 
system did not spring up out of nowhere. It became entrenched not only 










































LABOR LAW FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: STALLED REFORM IN THE US 
primarily through the collective efforts of millions of ordinary working Ameri-
cans, who impressed their hopes and aspirations onto the law. Brave men 
and women sacrificed to establish collective bargaining and employee 
rights; some gave their lives. We should honor their contribution. 
Nonetheless, in its classic form, the New Deal collective bargaining sys-
tem contains certain shortcomings that, in the light of contemporary 
trends, limit the system's contribution to employment democracy and 
economic growth and renewal. As a model of industrial democracy, the 
New Deal system was flawed and incomplete to begin with and has only 
partially, although significantly, succeeded in democratizing the organisa-
tion and governance of work. Because of legal and other limitations, 
many, perhaps the majority, of American workers have been legally or 
practically excluded from the benefits of collective bargaining and have 
been remitted to an entirely inadequate system of generiC social guaran-
tees that, in practical effect, encourages labor market segmentation and 
victimization of women and people of color. 
In any event, the New Deal system is now gravely threatened and in 
decline; and, although the point is routinely exaggerated, the system is in 
some respects maladapted to contemporary competitive challenges and 
the aspirations of our increasingly diverse workforce. 
Thus, effective labor law reform must do more than revamp NLRB pro-
cedures or tinker with [the statute]. We need to move toward an entirely 
new model of workplace relations, one that preserves the best accom-
plishments and virtues of collective bargaining, but modernizes and 
updates it and also provides a new array of employee rights and partici-
pation opportunities. A convincing and effective program for labor law 
reform must encompass, and must be seen and understood by the Ameri-
can people to encompass, a comprehensive program for workplace justice 
in both unionized and nonunion workplaces. Moreover, this program must 
be built upon a convincing account of the changing realities and pressures 
of an increasingly integrated and competitive world economy. Only a 
broad-based approach of this kind has a chance to generate sufficient 
popular enthusiasm and support to push labor law reform to the forefront 
of the nation's political attention. Unless we aim high, there is little chance 
that our efforts, even if legislatively successful, will foster fundamental and 
positive change. 
With these thoughts in mind, I advocate a labor and employment law 
reform program with four major dimensions: 
1.1 Revise collective bargaining law 
Collective bargaining through independent labor unions remains a central 
component of industrial democracy. Labor law reform must begin with a 
thorough revamping of the law, procedures. and remedies under the 
NLRA designed to afford employees a fair opportunity to engage in 
meaningful collective bargaining should they so choose. In practice, NLRA 
law. procedures. and remedies systematically deny American workers a 
fair opportunity to engage in collective bargaining. and they elevate the 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
1.2 Raise the social minimum wages and benefits package 
The most productive asset in the economy is the intelligence. persever-
ance, skill, and problem solving abilities of American employees. Any 
hope for economic renewal turns on investing in employees (investing in 
"human capital"). In practice, this means that public policy should dis-
courage low-wage employment and seek to liFt the minimum living, 
working, and training conditions of all employees. Labor law reForm 
should devote particular and intense attention to low-wage and so-called 
"contingent" employees (those without a stable career relationship with a 
particular employer), who predominantly are outside the collective bar-
gaining framework at present. The "social minimum wage and benefits 
package" should be seen to' include not only monetary entitlements and 
services, but also the array of background legal rules that determine 
power relations in the workplace. An obvious and urgent example is that 
labor law reform should establish as a basic legal right, part of the package 
of entitlements employees bring to work, that no employee may be 
discharged without just cause. 
1.3 Reform should be geared to our increasingly diverse, 
multicultural workforce 
The labor law reform process should place emphasis on addressing the 
needs, interests, and concerns of women workers and employees of color, 
groups which have suffered a long history of labor market discrimination. 
To put a fine point on it, in my view, no labor law reform program can 
succeed that does not have a pronounced feminist and race-conscious 
dimension. Women comprise close to half of the paid work force and up-
wards of 35 percent of the labor movement. and approximately two thirds 
of projected job growth in the next decade will be in positions traditionally 
occupied by women. Thus, for example, labor law reform should not be 
solely concerned with full-time employees in the high-wage sector, who 
tend to be white males, but should also focus searchingly on the problems 
confronting part-time and contract employees, among whom women and 
people of color are over represented. Issues pertaining to the stresses of 
combining paid employment with family and caretaking responsibilities 
should be high on the list of employment law reform priorities. 
1.4 Reform should encourage employee participation 
Labor law reform should encourage democratic restructuring of the or-
ganisation and governance of work, both at the enterprise level and at the 
level of routine operations. This would involve mandating or encouraging 
new forms and institutions of employee participation, consistent with a 
continuing and meaningful option of employees to bargain collectively. 
Additionally, labor law reForm would be incomplete if it did not also focus 
on changes needed to bring a greater degree of democracy and participa-
tion to the internal liFe of labor unions. 
The remainder of this paper elaborates on these points, focusing on the 










































LABOR LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: STALLED REFORM IN THE US 
problem of union decline; the need for labor law reform to address labor 
standards improvement and participation opportunities for all employees. 
including those who are outside the unionized sector; and, the need to 
explore new forms of workplace representation and participation in addi-
tion to (although not as a substitute for) collective bargaining. 
2 THE PROBLEM OF UNION DECLINE IN AMERICA 
Barring some extraordinary change in current trends, the vast majority of 
private sector employees in the United States will not enjoy the benefits of 
collective bargaining for at least the next 10 to 20 years, perhaps longer. 
This means that, over the next generation, most American workers will 
realize improved benefits and working conditions, if at all, not through 
collective bargaining but either because of the intervention of public law 
or because employers voluntarily improve conditions in order to enhance 
morale and productivity or as a union avoidance technique. 
To understand why this is so and what the implications are for labor law 
reform, it is useful to begin with an analysis of the causes of union decline 
in the United States in recent decades. The basic data reflecting union 
decline are well known. According to BLS statistics, union density has 
plummeted from a high of about 35.5 percent in 1945 to 15.8 percent in 
1992. ("Union density" refers to union membership as a percentage of the 
paid workforce.) However. in the private sector (which accounts for more 
than 80 percent of paid employment). union density is only 11,5 percent. 
(The most recent data. covering 1995, showed overall density at 14,9 
percent. with private sector density at a bare 10,4 percent.) It is sad but 
true that private sector union density is now at roughly the same level as 
prevailed before the Wagner Act and the great organizing drives of the 
1930s. If current trends continue, private sector unionization will be about 
5 percent by the end of the decade. 
What has caused this dramatic decline? Public discussion of this ques-
tion tends toward an unilluminating polarization. Labor's partisans insist 
that employer opposition to unions, particularly high-pressure and illegal 
tactics. is the primary cause of de-unionization ('employer opposition 
thesis'). Critics claim, to the contrary, that unionization has declined be-
cause American workers have chosen to reject it ('employee choice 
theory'). There are several versions of the employee choice theory, but it 
is common to attribute the change in preferences to structural changes in 
the economy. such as the shift from manufacturing to white collar, serv-
ices and retail. 
The empirical evidence is too unruly to sustain simplistic analyses of the 
causes of union decline. For example, the structural changes explanation 
does not do justice to dramatic organizing successes in recent years 
among certain categories of white collar and service workers (notably, 
school teachers and nurses). Moreover, as Professor Weiler points out, the 
structural changes explanation begs the hard question of exactly why cer-
tain occupational categories are or might be unsympathetic to unionization. 
But the core fallacy of the opposition versus. choice rhetoric is the 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
understood in isolation from one another and from social context. Indus-
trial unionism triumphed in the 1930s and 1940s against bitter, some-
times deadly, employer opposition, Why has labor been so much less 
successful against the new, sophisticated but on the whole tamer forms of 
union avoidance? 
Moreover, employee preferences are not wholly exogenous to man-
agement practices and the background legal structure. Employer hardball 
tactics and the Government's seemingly helpless response to the surge in 
unfair labor practices (ULPs) impact on the formation of employee prefer-
ences. Indeed, survey data reveals that upwards of 40 percent of non-
union workers believe that their own employer would illegally victimize 
union supporters in a representation campaign. A proper appreciation of 
the causal role of changing employee preferences in union decline must 
take account of the fact that employees rationally calculate that the weak-
nesses of NLRA substantive, procedural. and remedial law elevate the 
risks and costs of collective bargaining and diminish its value, 
In my view, the academic literature conclusively establishes that em-
ployer unfair labor practices and other strong-arm tactics constitute an 
important factor in explaining the long-term decline of union density in 
the United States. In practical effect, the weaknesses of the NLRA permit 
forms of employer resistance to and subversion of collective bargaining 
that are not tolerated in any of the other advanced industrial democracies, 
These features of NLRA law represent an important factor in explaining 
labor's decline over the past 30 years, The NLRA has proved inadequate to 
protect the elementary rights of free association and concerted activity 
ostenSibly entrenched in law nearly 60 years ago, This must be remedied 
if the nation wishes to be minimally faithful to its democratic promises, 
Accordingly, labor law reform must surely address the problem of improv-
ing NLRA doctrine, processes, and enforcement. 
It is instructive to compare the recent experience in the public sector 
with private sector developments. In the public sector, which admittedly 
comprises much the smaller share of total paid employment. 1992 union 
density was at 36,7 percent. (The 1995 public-sector figure was up slightly, 
at 37,8 percent.) This high figure was reached despite the fact that many 
states do not permit public sector collective bargaining. Union density 
among eligible public employees in the "bargaining states" (states that 
permit their public employees to engage in collective bargaining) is esti-
mated as high as 70 percent. In the federal sector, union density reaches 
as high as 50 percent among white collar and 85 percent among blue 
collar workers. An important new study shows that in recent years the 
union-win rate4 in the public sector has been a staggering 85 percent. s 
Why has unionization fared so much better, and why does it continue to 
grow in the public sector? The primary reason is that, once a jurisdiction 
commits itself to public sector collective bargaining, governmental employers 
4 Ie in ballots over union representation at bargaining unit level [Editor], 
5 See Bronfenbrenner &. Juravich (1993). See also "Public SeclOr Unions Win", 144 Labor 
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typically do not engage in the illegal and strong-arm tactics of union avoid-
ance frequently deployed by private employers. Thus. representation elec-
tions in the public sector more fairly reflect the preferences of the voters. 
free from illicit coercive pressures." 
Thus, the public sector/private sector comparison confirms that the un-
favorable legal climate in the private sector is significantly responsible for 
the decline of private sector unionization. Accordingly. all who believe in 
workplace justice should work hard to achieve significant reform of the 
NLRA and collective bargaining law. The most important reform proposals 
are familiar, and I simply list them here without extended discussion: 
(a) card-check recognition 7 and/or expedited election procedures; 
(b) organizer access to employer premises and captive audience reply 
rights; 
(e) a ban on permanent striker replacement; 
(d) first contract arbitration as a remedy for surface bargaining; 
(e) an enhanced duty to bargain. including successorship and double-
breasting protections, greater information access. and an expanded 
"scope" of bargaining to include a duty to bargain over major entre-
preneurial decisions such as plant closure; 
(f) removal of the highly constraining restrictions on concerted activity, 
including elimination of Reagan [National Labour Relations] Board 
limitations on unorganized employee protests, loosening restrictions 
on secondary appeals in aid of primary strikes and organizing cam-
paigns, overruling the use of injunctions against bona fide grievance 
and safety strikes, and expansion of the right to strike to non-emer-
gency public sector workers; 
(g) expanded protections for part-time, temporary, and contract workers, 
including expanded coverage under labor protective statutes and im-
posing Labor Act obligations on the purchasers of temporary and con-
tract services (thus treating them as primary employers or as "joint 
employers" along with the agency referring the temporary or contract 
labor); 
(h) streamlining NLRB procedures and dramatically enhancing Board 
interim and final remedies; 
6 Some commentators suggest anorher. somewhat counterintuitive. reason for union 
success in the public sector. Public sector bargaining laws generally deny unions their 
most cherished weapon, the strike. Other mechanisms, such as interest arbitration, are 
used to break deadlocks in economic bargaining. While these procedures sometimes 
produce smaller gains for employees than the traditional methods of economiC contlict. 
the strike has been declining in effectiveness and power as a conflict resolution tactic 
for years. as employers have become more skillful and determined in strike resistance 
and have been increasingly willing to utilise strike replacements. Thus, the fact that the 
strike remains labor's ultimate weapon in the private sector may actually have become 
an uninviting prospect to some potential recruits to labor's cause. 
7 "Card-check recognition" means that the employer's duty to recognize and bargain with 
the union automatically takes effect when a majority (or, say. 60%) of employees in a 
bargaining unit sign an authorization deSignating the union as their bargaining represen-
tative. This method has been successfully instituted in some Canadian jurisdictions. 
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(i) granting victims of discriminatory discharge the right to bring a civil 
action for damages and equitable relief including interim and perma-
nent reinstatement; 
U) contractor debarment of repeat labor law violators and firms that 
utilize anti-union consultants; 
(k) extension of public sector collective bargaining to all state and local 
jurisdictions; 
(I) expansion of NLRA coverage to include presently excluded employ-
ees, such as agricultural and domestic workers, managerial employ-
ees who are not true executives, and contract and other contingent 
employees. 
Enacting these reforms would begin to set the nation back on the path 
promised in 1935, that all employees will have a right to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing. But the fact is that 
the problem of union decline probably would not be entirely solved even 
in the unlikely, if devoutly to be desired, event that every proposal just 
listed were promptly enacted. This is because illegal employer resistance 
is not the sole cause of union decline. Without detailing the voluminous 
scholarly literature, let me focus on two important points in support of this 
conclusion. 
Despite the NLRB's seeming unwillingness or inability to stem the tide 
of illegal employer campaign tactics, the union win-rate in representation 
elections has not declined precipitously in recent years. The union-win 
rate averaged over 70 percent in the early 1950s and then began to 
decline. By the early 1970s, the win-rate was a bit over 50 percent. How-
ever, in the years since 1975, a period of catastrophic decline in union 
density, the win-rate has held fairly steady, hovering in the range of 45-50 
percent. s 
Second, reliable studies demonstrate that union density would still have 
declined in the United States, although not as swiftly, even if unions had 
had better electoral success rates. For example, Dickens and Leonard 
have shown that union density in the United States would still have de-
clined somewhat even if unions had continued to win representation 
rights for the same percentage of voters as they did in the t 950-1 954 
period. Indeed, unionization would still have declined somewhat, although 
much less steeply, even had unions won every single election they en-
tered since 1950 (Dickens & Leonard 1985: 323 332 fn 27). 
Thus, there are other causes of union decline besides employer resis-
tance and unfair labor practices.
Q 
Precise quantification of the relative 
8 laLonde and Meltzer (1991: 960) point out that "the overall decline in union success rates 
in NLRB elections (Since the 1 950s) can be attributed principally to union election failures 
in the traditionally organized sectors of the economy". Recently there has been a slight 
improvement in the win-rate, In 1992, unions won 49.9% of elections: in 1991 and 1990, 
the Win-rates were 46,8% and 47.6%. respectively. No doubt, the improved election for-
tunes reflect greater selectivity in petition filings. Cf Chaison & Dhavale (I 990: 368), 
9 Labor's supporters often compare the beleaguered state of unionization in the US with its 
more robust status and much higher density in Canada, and then attribute the difference 
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influence of the various causal factors has eluded scholars, but there can 
be no doubt that the following items each playa significant role (in addi-
tion to the powerful influence of employer resistance tactics): 
(a) the changing occupational composition of the workforce, induced by 
technological and product market changes: 
(b) the poor state of the American economy in recent years, accompa-
nied by significant job loss in traditional labor strongholds; 
(c) changes in the nature of the employment relationship (ie, the trend 
away From single-firm, single-site, career employment to more casual, 
contingent, and mobile relationships); 
(d) union "substitution" and other lawful. "soft" tactics of union avoid-
ance, such as greenfield siting and the implementation of "advanced" 
human resource management (so-called "advanced" employers have 
proved exceedingly difficult to organize); 
(e) erosion of the sheltered status the organized sector enjoyed a gen-
eration ago due to the intensification of world trade competition, the 
deregulation movement, and similar pressures which have height-
ened employer opposition even in organized establishments and 
made it very difficult to produce substantial gains through the collec-
tive bargaining process; and, 
(f) declining union investment in organizing. 
In addition, one must acknowledge that, with some notable exceptions, 
organized labor has experienced difficulty in adjusting to these develop-
ments and modifying its organizing and bargaining strategies so as to 
neutralize employer resistance, and labor continues to struggle to project 
a more modern image capable of capturing the imagination of new gen-
erations of American workers. 
For these and other reasons, the vast majority of American workers are 
not likely to enjoy the benefits of collective bargaining for the foreseeable 
future, even with major NLRA reform. Accordingly, any serious program 
for labor law reform must address not only the problems of union repre-
sentation and collective bargaining, but also the question of how law can 
to Canada's more union-friendly labor law regime. There is much that is enviable in Ca-
nadian labor law. and it is appropriate for friends of collective bargaining to make the 
comparison and to point out the superiority of Canadian law. Nevertheless. the compari-
son can be easily be exaggerated. risking the danger that we will not fully understand the 
causes of union decline in the US or. for that matter. certain problematical trends in Can-
ada (such as recent signs of decline in union growth) and weaknesses of the Canadian le-
regime. The US/Canada comparison must place the labor law differences in a broader 
context. Canada has far more public sector employment than the US and a considerably 
more progreSSive political culture. Quite apart from the differences in law. for reasons of 
political culture and tradition. Canadian employers are generally more receptive to collec-
live bargalfling than their American counterparts. and generally they do not viciously op-
pose unions in the manner of many American employers. One must also take account of 
the presence in Canada of an established social democratiC party with strong trade union 
links that from time to time has held power at the provincial level (where much Canadian 
labor law and policy are formulated) and. despite recent reverses. has sometimes held an 
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best serve the needs and protect the interests of employees who are not 
presently or foreseeably represented by labor unions. 
I wish this were not true. The decline of unionism is a tremendous loss 
for American democracy and political culture. Unions gave working peo-
ple a voice in political life and have transmitted appealing notions of 
solidarity and social commitment down through the generations. Collec-
tive bargaining celebrates the idea of employees making gains through 
their own efforts and solidarity. rather than bureaucratic largesse. 
In my view, an independent and democratic labor union movement is 
an essential feature of a democratic society. At least so long as massive 
inequalities of power exist in the workplace. employees will have a need 
for autonomous organization to aggregate their interests and voices. and 
to identify and articulate their collective needs independent of employer 
domination. Autonomous organization is needed to maximize employees' 
collective strength. and to facilitate pursuit of independent. concerted 
action to protect their interests. In addition. collective bargaining pro-
motes employee autonomy and participation, and. hence, self-determin-
ation, because of its unique capacity. when functioning well. for flexible 
adaptation to local conditions and therefore for decentralized. participa-
tory problem-solving. Collective bargaining creates powerful and welcome 
pressure toward social and economic equality, and is an effective tool for 
advancing the economic fortunes of women and minorities and for com-
bating poverty. As institutions of working people, unions can contribute to 
civic and political democracy, particularly in a political system like ours 
that lacks an established social democratic tradition and major labor or 
social democratic parties. 
Having said all this, I do not mean to imply that the New Deal model of 
collective bargaining and labor law is a completed system of industrial 
democracy or that it presents no difficulties. In the heated context of 
labor-management debate, there is an understandable tendency for 
supporters of collective bargaining to defend and extol the New Deal 
system and CIO'o social unionism in complacent, exaggerated, or even 
romanticized terms. It is more helpful and productive to face up to the 
limitations and difficulties of the New Deal model candidly and forthrightly 
and to be open to the possibility that collective bargaining may need to 
adapt and change. 
It is crucial for reformers to appreciate that collective bargaining is an 
adaptable and changing institutional form and that the New Deal system is 
only one, historically specific instance of the collective bargaining ideal. 
That is, one can be an ardent supporter of collective bargaining and still 
harbor reservations about the particular form collective bargaining took in 
the New Deal system, Similarly, doubts about or criticisms of the New 
Deal system do not automatically entail the conclusion that collective 
10 congress of Industrial Organizations, formed in 1935 to organize workers in mass 
production industries, in contrast to the American Federation of Labor (AFL) consisting 










































LABOR LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: STALLED REFORM IN THE US 
bargaining is obsolete and should be entirely superseded by some other 
system of workplace governance. 
The limitations and difficulties are substantial. Despite its profound con-
tribution, the New Deal system of collective bargaining and labor law is 
only ambivalently committed to democratizing work and labor markets. 
The New Deal system takes for granted unilateral management control 
over strategic decision-making for the firm, and it is largely based on the 
premise that work must be organized on a hierarchical and authoritarian 
basis. The New Deal system made a significant but inherently limited 
effort to achieve an egalitarian reconstruction of labor markets. Moreover, 
the background economic, social, and institutional circumstances that 
gave rise to the New Deal system are rapidly unraveling, so that the 
system is mismatched with contemporary economic and social Challenges 
and opportunities. 
New Deal collective bargaining and labor law are largely products of the 
era of "Fordism", a phase in American economic history when business 
was oriented toward mass manufacturing of standardized goods in high 
volume runs made with "dedicated" or inflexible technology. This was a 
period of relatively limited international wage competition. In this system, 
the employee is a commandjollower. The labor relations framework 
corresponding to mass manufacturing was "Taylorism", which involved a 
sharp separation between managerial and production workers. and be-
tween conception and execution; systematic reduction of skill levels in all 
jobs by divesting employees of craft and production knowledge and 
transferring it to management; subdivision of jobs into minute, routinized 
tasks paced by machines; and rigid hierarchy, monitoring. and discipline. 
Social policy in the Fordist era was based on a sharp separation between 
work life and home life and a durable sexual division of labor sustained by 
the concept of the family wage. 
New Deal industrial unionism was a defensive rebellion against and 
resistance to the oppressiveness of Fordism. yet New Deal unionism 
embodies or mirrors many of its features. Just as Taylorist management 
subdivided jobs and monitored closely, labor protected its interests 
through complex rules of job description. work assignment, and compen-
sation fixed to jobs, and these rules were closely monitored and legalisti-
cally enforced through adversary grievance procedures. Benefits and 
"welfare" are tied to the possession of a job. but labor was given little 
input into or control over the strategic bUSiness decisions that determine 
whether there are jobs. 
Business spokespersons and some academic commentators claim that 
New Deal job control unionism entrenches socially counter-productive 
rigidities that inhibit technological innovation and adaptation to contem-
porary competitive challenges. The evidence for this proposition is less 
conclusive than frequently assumed by the media, and there is consider-
able evidence to the contrary. But let me grant merit to the point for 
purposes of discussion. After all, the very purpose of job control unionism 
is to establish rules that inhibit managerial freedom of action. Nonethe-
less, in its historical context, job control unionism was an entirely rational 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
their interests within a system of decentralized wage determination, 
limited worker political power, and ferocious and violent management re-
sistance to unions, 
Management got the style of collective bargaining for which it asked, It 
seems perverse now to blame unions for the adversary frame of American 
industrial relations, "Adversary bashing" amounts to a covert attack on 
one of the few remaining forms of worker power in our society, Labor 
cannot realistically be expected to relax its commitment to New Deal job 
control unionism absent a genuine readiness on the other side to abandon 
Taylorism, to accept unions, and to entrench an alternative system that 
guarantees workplace equity, employment security, and meaningful forms 
of power-sharing, including collective bargaining. 
The labor law framework we inherited from the New Deal and postwar 
periods reflects these features of industrial unionism as a defensive reac-
tion to Fordism, On the positive side, the law guarantees narrowly con-
strained rights of organisation and collective bargaining, basically rights to 
engage in conventional wage and fringe bargaining. Unions used these 
rights with immense success to raise living standards, But the system 
contains severe restrictions on even mildly unconventional or disapproved 
forms of collective action, such as grievance protests, secondary boycotts, 
and political strikes, 
The central institution of postwar industrial unionism is the grievance 
and arbitration procedure, which creates an enclave of due process within 
the private sphere, thereby curbing management power. Perhaps the 
most important example of this is the nearly universal dissemination to 
unionized workers of protections against unjust dismissal through the "just 
cause" clause of the collective bargaining agreement. Nearly alone among 
the advanced democracies, the United States (apart from the State of Mon-
tana) has no statutory protection against unfair dismissal in the private 
sector. However, unionized workers obtained such protection through 
contract. This represents an historic achievement of the American working 
class. 
But the New Deal labor law framework also contains substantial limita-
tions and undemocratic features, which are routinely overlooked by labor 
movement critics of alternative representation models. The system is 
premised upon solicitous protection for managerial prerogatives regarding 
both strategiC business decisions and day-to-day operations and work 
aSSignments, Employee participation is excluded from managerial deci-
sions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial controL" As to almost all sig-
nificant decisions about capital investment, disinvestment, and the like, 
workers have limited or no rights of notice, information, consultation, or 
bargaining, 
I I Fibreboard Paper Products Corp v NLRB 379 US 203 223 (1964) (Stewart J concurring), 
See also First National Maintenance Corp v NLRB 452 US 666 676 (1981) "Congress 
had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal part-
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Regarding day-to-day operations, the basic rule is that management 
manages and the worker obeys. If a management command violates the 
contract, the employee may protest through the grievance procedure, but, 
with few exceptions, is obliged to obey during the interim no matter how 
inappropriate the employer's order. That is, industrial unionism and 
collective bargaining are premised upon hierarchical and authoritarian 
organization of work. Within the New Deal system, the employee remains 
a command follower. 12 
In certain important but limited areas. unions can bargain for work rule 
changes or protest violations of contractually established rules. But this is 
largely an after-the-fact. "defensive", or "reactive" form of industrial de-
mocracy within an enclave, not an open-ended. prospective. continuous. 
fully informed. and participatory democracy. It is a tragic irony that, in its 
currently beleaguered and isolated situation. the labor movement defends 
and celebrates a system of industrial relations committed to authoritarian-
ism in work organization and to only a limited form of democracy in en-
terprise governance. 
Additional problems arise from linkages between the New Deal collec-
tive bargaining system and overall social policy in the United States. The 
basic New Deal social policy idea is minimalist social provision through an 
exceedingly ungenerous safety net. Issues of social and economic security 
were to be tackled primarily through labor markets and collective bargain-
ing, not through social provision or entitlements. Indeed. in many of the 
most important social benefits programs. such as old age benefits. acci· 
dent compensation, and unemployment insurance. eligibility and benefit 
levels are closely tied to labor market attachment. Unlike most of the 
advanced industrial nations. which provide more or less generous public 
benefits to all citizens (or residents), the United States has largely privat-
ized the provision of social welfare. 
Postwar collective bargaining made extraordinary gains for millions of 
workers and their families. particularly as fringe bargaining became com-
mon in the 1950s. But, the privatized welfare system had its costs. For 
one thing. it drove a wedge between the organized and secondary, largely 
unorganized sectors of the labor market. Because women and people of 
color are so heavily oveHepresented in the secondary, unorganized 
sector. labor market segmentation induced by the privatization of welfare 
has compromised the ability of collective bargaining fully to address the 
interests of our increasingly diverse, multicultural workforce, much of 
which remains unorganized. 
12 One striking proof of this is the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v Yeshiva University 444 
US 672 (1980)' which holds that most university professors are "managerial employees" 
excluded from Labor Act rights and protections. The Court did not really conclude that 
professors are managerial because they perform executive functions. Rather, because pro' 
fessors traditionally have considerable autonomy within and control over their work, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that they could not be "employees". In the end, professors were 
placed in the category of managerials because that was the sole remaining legal category 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
Moreover, the New Deal system carried forward the family wage idea. 
The premise of collectively bargained social security is that a breadwinner 
(ordinarily a husband) will hold a full time job for life and bring home a 
wage and benefits package that can support the family. To the extent the 
family wage premise was actually realized in collective bargaining prac-
tice, this only reinforced the gender division of labor and entrenched a 
hierarchy between continuous, full-time jobs and more casual employ-
ment, with profoundly destructive consequences for the economic for-
tunes and social opportunities of women and minority groups. 
For these reasons, even ardent admirers of the New Deal collective bar-
gaining system must look beyond its hallowed assumptions, acknowledge 
its weaknesses, and join in the process of rethinking work organization, 
business structure, modes of workplace representation. and social provi-
sion policy. 
3 LABOR LAW REFORM FOR THE UNREPRESENTED: 
LOW-WAGE WORKERS. CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT, 
AND THE DIVERSIFIED WORKFORCE 
Thus far, the debate on labor law reform and the testimony before this 
Commission have primarily concerned the collective bar~aining sector 
and nonunion but high-paying, primary sector employment. 3 To touch the 
needs and concerns of the majority of American workers, and to arouse 
sufficient political attention and enthusiasm to rise onto the nation's 
legislative agenda, labor law reform must look beyond problems of union 
organization and collective bargaining and develop programs for improv-
ing workplace conditions through political and other processes. President 
Clinton, Secretary Reich, and other members of the Administration have 
opened the door to a comprehensive approach by emphasizing the na-
tion's need to invest in human capital. "Human capital investment" is a 
formal way of talking about better treatment, training, and deployment of 
employees so that. in turn, employees are more committed, motivated, 
and productive. Thus, the Administration's human capital strategy for 
economic growth and competitiveness meshes closely with the question 
of enhancing workers' capabilities, rights, and dignity on the job. 
In that light, a core objective of labor law reform should be to raise the 
social minimum wage and benefits package." The Commission should 
13 The most notable exception to this generalization was the important conference spon-
sored by the Department of Labor's Women's Bureau on October t 4, 1993, focusing on 
the employment law reform concerns of women workers, induding those in the low-
wage, nonunion sector. In addition, the December 15, 1993, testimony of John J Sweeney, 
PreSident, Service Employees' International Union, AFL-CIO, and the November 8, 1993, 
statement of Lane Kirkland. President, AFL-CIO [to the Dunlop Commission]. both em-
phasized the concerns of low-wage employees and the contingent workforce. 
14 The "social minimum wage and benefits package" refers to a society'S legally mandated 
economic floor. Five main aspects of law combine to determine this level: 
118 
(1) social provision or the social wage, meaning government benefits and entitlements 
guaranteed by law; 









































LABOR LAW FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: STALLED REFORM IN THE US 
recommend and advocate a program of reforms designed to discourage 
low-wage and low-skill labor and to encourage high-wage, high-skill em-
ployment. 
Reforms should be designed to utilize public law, as well as the collec-
tive bargaining process, to take "wages and benefits out of competition", 
at least to the extent of guaranteeing a minimally decent standard of living 
for all people residing in the United States Law should be systematically 
deployed to reduce labor market segmentation (to close the gap between 
the primary and secondary sectors of the labor market). That is, law 
reform should aim to take the low-wage option away from employers. 
Despite that low-wage production processes provide profit-taking oppor-
tunities for particular employers in particular markets, over the long run 
such strategies degrade human capital and undermine the competitive 
position and growth potential of the economy as a whole. The United 
States cannot build sustainable growth or compete successfully against the 
more industrialized developing nations on a low-wage, low-quality basis. 
Only a high-quality strategy is consistent with postindustrial growth, and 
this implies the need for a highly trained and motivated workforce com-
pensated at levels commensurate with the high values it adds. 
Social provision and minimum standards policies in the United States 
should be designed to enhance human capital, and labor protective pro-
grams should prevent the degradation of human capital. The govern-
ment's own purchasing power should extend an exemplary, socially 
acceptable (not just minimum) wage and benefits package to the vast 
public-contracting sector. Labor reform policy should promote serious, 
lifetime training programs and adjustment assistance. While some part of 
the costs of such programs should be funded by government, enterprises, 
too, should be made to bear and internalize at least some of the costs of 
capital mobility and economic adjustment. Labor reform should crack 
down on the growing child labor problem in the United States; raise the 
minimum wage; and improve retirement protectiOns (by lowering the 
vesting threshold, improving portability. tightening pension funding 
obligations, eliminating rules that allow employers to profit from plan 
terminations. and by mandating advance funding of health insurance 
benefits, as is required for pensions). The vagaries of American polities 
have made "health care reform" a separate issue from "labor law reform", 
but obviously entrenchment of a decent health care program comports 
(2) employer mandated wages and benefits. minimum wages, benefits. and conditions that 
employers are legally obligated to observe ("labor standards law"); 
(3) the indirect impact on labor markets of government purchasing and contracting activity, 
including particularly the effects of social criteria embedded in government procure-
ment policy (such as affirmative action set-asides and prevailing wage requirements); 
(4) immigration and international trade law, particularly the degree to which labor and 
human rights guarantees embedded in trade policy affect prevailing labor conditions 
in immigration-source and trade-partner nations; and. 
(5) the background regime of legal entitlements and prohibitions that structure power 
relations between employers and employees (such as rules about the power of the 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
fully with the objective of raising the social wage to enhance human 
capitaL 
Systematic attention must be paid to issues of special concern to 
women employees, particularly by addressing contemporary problems 
and stresses of combining paid labor with parenting and other caretaking 
commitments. If we were to speak candidly about the felt needs of Ameri-
can employees and would-be employees, obtaining a decent and effective 
childcare program would almost certainly be at or near the top of the list. 15 
If the nation were seriously committed to a strategy of promoting eco-
nomic growth by mobilizing the energies and skills of all Americans, 
establishing a decent, affordable, and accessible childcare system would 
be a priority. Similarly, firm links should be drawn in the public mind 
between labor law reform and civil rights issues such as pay equity, guar-
antees of diversity, and protections against sexual harassment. 
Another concern should be to extend the minimum social benefits 
package to part-time and contract workers, a burgeoning group excluded 
from many protective laws and disadvantaged within or actually excluded 
from collective bargaining. At a minimum, labor law reform should seek 
to close the loopholes in statutory coverage under the NLRA, ERISA, 
workers compensation, unemployment compensation, and other statutory 
programs. Beyond this, labor law reform should mandate pro-rata, full-
time or eqUivalent benefits and health care coverage for part-time em-
ployees; employer contributions to fully portable retirement trusts for 
mobile and contingent workers; and, appropriate opportunities for flexible 
scheduling and voluntary part-time work as a component of fair labor 
standards law. 
The labor law reform process should also carefully review the interface 
between employment policy and social welfare programs. A consensus 
apparently exists among politicians and media pundits that welfare pro-
grams create a form of dependency that discourages able-bodied recipi-
ents from entering paid employment (even when jobs are available). It is 
fashionable to blame the victims for their fate, often in language coded 
with racism. In fact, serious empirical study of the so-called welfare de-
pendency thesis shows that most recipients are eager to enter paid em-
ployment and would gladly do so if decent jobs for which they are or 
could be trained were available and if effective solutions could be found to 
the problems of childcare and health coverage. But our society is not 
creating such jobs in meaningful numbers, childcare and training oppor-
tunities are limited and ineffective, and most low-wage jobs do not pro-
vide health coverage. Thus, American social policy does discourage 
recipients from entering the labor market, but not (as we are told) because 
government generosity induces dependency and laziness, but rather 
because social policy fails to provide the minimal supports necessary for 
15 Only 1 1.1 percent of American employers provide any child-care benefits or services. and 
that includes employers who provide only information and reFerrals. Only 5.2 percent of 
employers (in the private sector, only 4.7 percent) provide day-care or assistance with 
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recipients to enter paid employment, and because welfare law actually 
penalizes recipients when they do become employed (eg, by removing 
Medicaid eligibility). By design or, at any rate, in practical effect, American 
welfare policy maintains a core underclass in desperate poverty. This 
produces dampening pressure on labor market floors and worker mili-
tancy. The shameful persistence of unspeakably oppressive poverty in one 
of the wealthiest nations on earth encourages those who are regularly 
attached to the labor market to regard bad wages and conditions as a 
bargain compared to the misery and social opprobrium of welfare. The 
labor law reform debate, particularly in light of the "human capital" spin 
provided by the Administration, offers an important opportunity to break 
this disastrous political cycle. 
4 CLOSING THE REPRESENTATION GAP 
I now return to Question I of the Commission's mandate, namely, whe-
ther new methods and institutions of employee participation should be 
encouraged and/or reqUired. My answer is "yes", for the reasons that fol-
low. 
Labor law reform must close the representation gap in the American 
workplace, so that all employees have at least some form of participation 
in enterprise governance through which they can monitor the implemen-
tation of legal guarantees, secure an equitable share of gains from pro-
ductivity increases, and acquire a voice in strategic business decisions that 
affect their lives. Survey data indicates that most American workers desire 
some form of representation and voice in enterprise governance, even if 
only a minority of the unorganized currently regard unionization as their 
preferred representational vehicle. In order to respond to the participatory 
aspirations of American workers, labor law reform should mandate or 
encourage new and revitalized forms of workplace representation. 
Labor law for the 21 st century should offer a diverse and accessible ar-
ray of representation mechanisms. I am cognizant that the Commission 
has invited me specifically to address the issue of management-instituted 
employee participation programs, particularly in reference to legal issues 
under NLRA section 8(a)(2). I will, of course, discuss that matter in some 
detail. However, before doing so, I would like to emphasize that employer-
instituted participation schemes represent only one among several forms 
of participatory innovation that should be conSidered, and by no means 
the most important. 1 will therefore list a range of other alternatives that I 
favor. although I will not pause in this context to provide a detailed expla-
nation and rationale for each. 
The first and foremost priority should be to eliminate the legal barriers 
to collective bargaining and to expand its meaning, scope, and potential 
as a system of workplace participation. Perhaps the most fundamental 
value expressed in the NLRA is the idea that. for industrial democracy to 
be genuine, employees must have an independent power base and focus 
for collective self-organisation. An independent employee power base is 
not only an advantage to employees themselves, but is also socially func-
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Only through power-sharing can employees elicit from and hold man-
agement to credible commitments of equitable treatment which are the 
foundation of workplace co-operation. Thus. a priority for labor law re-
form must be. once and for all. to guarantee employees a fair chance to 
bargain collectively in a meaningful and effective way through represen-
tatives of their own choosing. 
But we should do more than just revamp the representation and organ-
izing process and provide more effective remedies for surface bargaining 
and successorship problems. The scope and potentiality of collective 
bargaining should be expanded. Three examples of reforms that would 
revitalize collective bargaining are: 
(a) expanding the topics of mandatory bargaining to include entrepre-
neurial decisions that affect employees' job security and working 
conditions; 
(b) introducing legal changes to facilitate "sectoral bargaining" on an 
area-wide (eg. municipal) basis. where the employment relationship is 
contingent. fluid. and multisited'6; and. 
(c) facilitating "for-members-only" bargaining by unions or other organi-
sations that represent less than a majority of employees in a bar~ain­
ing unit (when no exclusive representative has been designated).' 
Expanded employee participation should apply to the decisions and 
processes of the labor movement as well as the enterprise. Labor law 
reform should address ways to democratize internal union affairs and 
promote affirmative action within unions. This would include such things 
as direct election of international union and federation officers; a legal 
requirement that all collective bargaining agreements be submitted for a 
vote of ratification; amendment of union election law to ease campaign 
burdens on challengers; and encouragement of and legal protection for 
affirmative action plans. so that labor's leadership becomes more reflec-
tive of membership diversity. 
Public policy should require or encourage (eg. through procurement 
policy) that enterprises be structured and governed in a democratic man-
ner. Hierarchical work organization and exclusion of employees from 
participation in enterprise governance are counterproductive and ineffi-
cient in today's economic world. As Professor Weiler (1990: 199) has 
written: "[w]e can no longer afford the traditional vertical relationship 
between manager and subordinate". 
16 This would involve, among other things, changes in the legal doctrines concerning 
bargaining units, joint employer status. and secondary pressure. The basic priniciple 
should be that labor rights and entitlements are attached to and travel with the employee. 
and that corresponding obligations accrue to any entity that stands in the functional rela-
tionship of employer. 
J 7 For-members-only or minority bargaining is generally legal in the US, but it is not obliga-
tory on the employer and meshes poorly with certain prevailing doctrines. A number of 
legal reforms would faCilitate [his representational mechanism. See generally Hyde, Sheed 
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To the end of democratizing the structure of the firm, I advocate that 
the United States entrench a system of works councils and co-deter-
mination similar to institutions widely established in Europe. However, 
although I support the works council idea in principle, I acknowledge that 
it is not likely to appear on the practical political agenda in the United 
States in the near future. Still. more modest but quite meaningful initia-
tives have been proposed and even legislated. 
The common thread of these proposals is that the law would mandate 
that all enterprises above a certain size establish a committee composed 
of or including elected (or union-designated) employee representatives 
that would have certain specified statutory functions (eg. safety inspec-
tion). A leading example is the program of mandated safety committees 
recently instituted in Oregon. which is credited with considerable success 
in reducing workplace injuries.'s At the federal level. the Comprehensive 
Occupational Safety & Health Reform Bill of 1993 (s 575) includes a 
provision requiring firms to have joint safety and health committees. This 
is a promising development. and hopefully enactment will lead. in turn. to 
introduction of an array of similar plant and firm-level councils or jOint 
committees focused on monitoring and enforcement of labor standards.'o 
Perhaps institutional innovation of this kind will someday preCipitate 
serious debate in this country regarding the establishment of participatory 
works councils in all enterprises. 
The primary reason to promote direct participation institutions is that 
they will enhance workplace democracy. Public policy should favor demo-
cratic work organization. But there is an additional. if more instrumental, 
reason for labor to promote new forms of workplace participation. Worker 
participation has a vital function to play in our economic future. Demo-
cratic reorganization of work. improved communication between and 
within all levels of enterprises, and a flattening of hierarchy are essential 
features of any viable strategy for economic renewal. 
In the post-industrial era, the engine of economic renewal is high qual-
ity. customized production of specialized goods and services. The emerg-
ing competitive environment reqUires the capability for rapid shifts and 
adjustments and therefore for flexible employees. flexible technOlogy, and 
more effective and creative linkages between employees and technology. 
In this environment. the worker can no longer be treated as a simple 
command-follower or an adjunct to the machine. Maximum utilization of 
employee potential, and therefore maximum productivity, can be 
achieved only if the employee is treated as an investigator, a learner, a 
problem solver, and a communicator. Postindustrial renewal requires new 
forms of work organization that build upon and enhance these capacities 
of workers. That is, economic renewal requires a more democratic and 
participatory workplace. Accordingly, employees have an economic stake 
18 See. ego Official Describes Benefits of Mandated 
Relations (8~A) 757 (August 4. 1993) (reporting testimony the CommiSSion) 
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in enlarging employee voice in enterprise governance. as well as a moral 
or justice stake. 
We now come to the question of nonmandated, employer-initiated par-
ticipation schemes. the so-called quality circles, quality of work liFe pro-
grams. labor-management joint committees. total quality management 
programs. and employee involvement schemes. I will refer to these pro-
grams generically as employee participation plans or EPPs.
20 
Some management spokespersons argue that participatory work or-
ganization is superior to the hierarchical forms characteristic of the Fordist 
era and that EPPs are essential to improving the competitiveness of 
American industry. They complain that the prohibition on company 
unions contained in NLRA section 8(a)(2), particularly as interpreted in 
recent cases such as Electromation Inc, 309 NLRB No 163. 142 LRRM 1001 
(1992), raises a substantial legal barrier to the introduction of EPPs. The 
argument is that section 8(a)(2) was designed to restrain hostile, anti-
union employers back in the old days and should not be read to bar 
benign and constructive work-innovation in today's radically altered 
circumstances. These days, management spokespersons, including wit-
nesses before this Commission, frequently advance the astonishing, if 
highly implausible, position that virtually every aspect of the nation's labor 
law system is just fine except For this one detail of section 8(a)(2). 
Recently it has been suggested. with some fanfare. that, as part of a 
labor law reform package, organized labor seek to "trade" a repeal of 
NLRA section 8(a)(2). or an overruling of the Electromation decision, in 
return for card-check recognition. streamlined NLRB election procedures. 
or other reform measures. 
In my view, management publicists have blown the section 8(a)(2) issue 
entirely out of proportion. and, I respectfully submit, this has diverted the 
debate from far more important and fundamental issues upon which the 
Commission should concentrate. It is very doubtful that management is 
interested in a trade of this kind. There is little evidence that sec-
tion 8(a)(2) presents much of a barrier to workplace innovation. Sophisti-
cated management counsel seem to feel that their clients have con-
siderable leeway with regard to bona fide participation schemes despite 
the Electromation ruling.ll Moreover, employers face no real penalty in the 
20 In this paper. "EPP" connotes a participation program that is not required by law. Typi-
cally it will be introduced at management's initiative. However, as used here. EPP also in-
cludes collectively bargained participation schemes 
21 An important recent study of the NLRB's caseload over the past two decades persuasively 
concludes that section 8(a)(2) poses no substantial deterrent to bonafide participation pro-
grams introduced by employers in good faith. See Rundle (1993: 24-26), Of course. the 
Rundle data do not rule out the pOSSibility that some or even many employers harbor sin-
cere concerns about the risk of section 8(a)(2) liability. given the uncertain state of the law. 
and that these fears exercise a chilling effect on innovation 
22 In a statement recently submitted to the Commission. former NLRB Chair Edward B 
124 
Miller. now a prominent management a!torney in urged caution in changing [he 
law, arguing [hat the Electromatlon decision had not inhibited companies from 
operating employee involvement schemes. (ailing the Electromation problem" a 
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unlikely event they are found to have violated section 8(a)(2). The stan-
dard remedy in interference and domination cases is disestablishment. In 
effect, the employer is simply told to discontinue the participation 
scheme. 23 
Moreover, the quality of the debate has been diluted by widespread 
repetition of a series of misunderstandings and myths. One is that policy-
makers face a stark choice between adversary and co-operative labor 
relations models. In fact, all viable and dynamic industrial relations sys-
tems have and must have both co-operative and adversary aspects. This 
stems from the nature of the employment relationship itself, which is at 
root a co-operative enterprise aimed at producing joint gains, but which 
also always contains an element of interest-conflict regarding the division 
of those gains. In the absence of some form of meaningful countervailing 
power through which employees can monitor the relationship and protect 
their interests, management has a permanent incentive to seek distribu-
tive advantage at the expense of efficiency and human capital. 
To put it another way, the trust necessary to get on with mutual gains 
solutions and productivity advancement requires the recognition of adver-
sary conflict through some form of power-sharing. So-called co-operation 
or participation schemes that do not involve authentic power-sharing are 
likely to be evanescent and to contribute nothing to economic renewal. 
The inflated rhetoric about Electromation to the contrary notwithstanding, 
most of the Board's section 8(a)(2) cases in recent years involve superficial 
participation programs of this kind. By contrast, considerable empirical 
evidence, much of it developed in research by Commission member 
Professor Thomas Kochan and his colleagues, demonstrates that partici-
pation programs work best and set down the most lasting roots in the 
presence of a strong union committed to innovation but poised to protect 
employee interests. Employer spokespersons who claim to favor em-
ployee involvement and participation, but who adamantly oppose any 
form of power-sharing, should not be credited by this Commission. 
Just as workplace co-operation needs an adversary component to suc-
ceed, traditional collective bargaining has always had a significant conflict-
avoidance or joint-gains aspect. The goal of collective bargaining is and 
always has been to reach an accommodation between labor and man-
agement in a setting in which the employer almost always has superior 
power and control over the fortunes of the enterprise. The portrait of 
traditional bargaining as wholly adversary is particularly pOignant in light 
of the billions of dollars in givebacks that labor conceded during the 
"myth", MlIIer (1993: 1044) argued that "(ilt is indeed possible to have effective 
(employee involvement) programs of this kind in both union and non-union companies 
without the neceSSity of any change in the current law." 
23 lowe the observation to union attorney Ira Sills, who recently made a superb suggestion 
regarding reform of section 8(a)(2) remedies. Sills noted that in many contemporary situa-
tions, a much more appropriate and potent remedy than disestablishment would be to 
order that the participation scheme be continued for at least a certain period of time, but 
that henceforth it be operated and structured on a basis autonomous from the employer 
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1980s. Such adversarialism as exists in American collective bargaining 
reflects a historically specific and understandable reaction to managerial 
Taylorism, not an inherent characteristic of American unions or feature of 
collective bargaining. 
The most important misunderstanding in the current section 8(a)(2) 
debate is the notion that prohibiting management dominated EPPs denies 
employees "free choice". The notion is that if employees do not like an 
EPP, they can always opt for collective bargaining (as though that were a 
costless and instantly effective possibility). There is some irony in man-
agement seeking the legal power unilaterally to determine workplace 
organization in the name of "employee free choice". But the basic fallacy 
in the argument is that the failure of employees either to qUit or to opt for 
collective bargaining does not necessarily indicate their satisfaction with or 
preference for the status quo. Well known forms of labor market failure 
may prevent employees from effective use of the threat of exit to bargain 
for the working conditions they favor. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
indicates that participation programs can and frequently are used to 
coerce employees, to isolate and pressure potential union activists, and 
generally to discourage employees from pursuing the path of unionization. 
The record of participation programs and QWL innovations in the 1970s 
and 1980s is punctuated with unfair labor practices. EPPs are frequently 
instituted in response to or in order to pre-empt union organizing drives. 
The Rundle study previously cited examined all cases between 1972 and 
1993 in which the NLRB ordered disestablishment of an employee com-
mittee or participation plan. In all but two cases (out of 58), the employer 
committed collateral Labor Act violations and/or commenced the EPP in 
response to an organizing drive.'· 
In its early cases on the company union problem, the Supreme Court 
developed a profound insight about the nature of "employee free 
choice".25 The teaching of these cases is that an apparent expression of 
choice, even in a secret ballot election, cannot automatically be taken to 
reflect employee preference. A history or context of employer coercion 
may vitiate the expression as an appropriate indicator of employee pref-
erence. 
The real question is whether and under what circumstances. EPPs ac-
tually contribute to democratizing work. Public policy should encourage 
employee participation, but it must also carefully guard against the abuse 
of employer power to undermine employees' rights to bargain collectively 
through independent labor unions. [n this matter, extreme caution is war-
ranted. 
Some take the view that the risk posed by EPPs to collective bargaining 
rights is so grave that there should be a monolithic prohibition of all 
participatory work redesign (unless it arises through collective bargaining). 
24 See Rundle (J 993). 
25 See generally NLRB v Link-Belt Co 31 J US 584 (1941); NLRB v Bradford Dyeing Ass'n 3 J 0 
US 3 J 8 (1940); NLRB v Falk Corp 308 US 453 (J 940); and NLRB v Newport News Shipbuild-
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The problem with this view is that, as we have seen, the vast majority of 
American workers most likely will not enjoy the benefits of collective 
bargaining in the foreseeable future, so that the "hard line" interpretation 
of section 8(a)(2) would leave most employees with no form of workplace 
representation at aiL This seems unwise. Non-unionized employees should 
have at least some opportunity for and experience of representation, even 
one that is a pale shadow of authentic workplace democracy. 
In my view, there is room for revision that would be responsive to the 
participatory aspirations of non-unionized employees but that would not 
undermine and might actually advance union interests. Many EPPs are 
likely to be superficial and contribute only marginally, if at all. either to 
workplace democracy or to productivity improvement. I reiterate my view 
that true employee participation and workplace democratization requires 
power-sharing, and it remains to be seen whether American management 
is interested. Nonetheless, the option to engage in participatory innovation 
should be available under appropriate constraining circumstances that will 
discourage or bar employer coercion. 
Thus. the problem becomes one of finding a formula that will allow 
some flexibility in redesigning work organization yet preserve the endur-
ing principle premise of section 8(a)(2), namely. the central importance 
and value of independent employee organization. The rules must be 
designed to restrain the power of employers. subtly or overtly. to bias 
employee choice in favor of the EPP and against the rigors and sacrifices 
of union organization. 
The remainder of the text sketches a possible revision of section 8(a)(2) 
designed to meet these criteria. Where unions are in place. I argued that 
all matters of employee participation must be collectively bargained with 
the union. In non-union settings, I set out nine minimum conditions for 
the legality of employer-implemented participation schemes, including 
secret ballot election of employee representatives. 
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